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STATES HAVING SOME FORM OF HOME RULE
Constitutional - indicated by
Legislative - indicated by L

c

STATE

ADOPTED

Alaska

1958 -

c

Art. X, Secs 9-11
Any borough or city
of the first class. Legislature may
extend it to all other boroughs and
cities.

Arizona

1912 -

c

Art XIII, Secs. 2,3.
or more population.

California

1879 - c

Art. XI, Secs. 6,7
Cities, towns, counties

Colorado

1902 - c

Art. XX, Secs 1-6
Ci ties and towns wi t'h 2, noo p o pul nt-. i.o n

Connecticut

1951 - L

Any city, town, borough

Florida

1956- L & c Art VIII, Sec. 11
Florida Statutes 166.01-15, every city
and town

Georgia

1965 - L

Georgia Code Annotated, Seco 69-101569-1020 Any municipality

Hawaii

1959- c

Art. VII, Sec. s
Each political subdivision

Idaho

1890 - c

Art Xii, Sec. 2
Confers local legislative authority
but no charter-making power

Iowa

(1858)
1963 - L

Special charter cities

Kansas

1961 - c

Cities

Louisiana

1946 -

c

Amendments of 1946, 1948, 1950 had
authorized home rule for particular
cities. In 1952 home rule granted
to any municipality

Maryland

1915 -

c

Art XI, A and E.

APPLICATION

(a)

Cities with 3,500

Municipal Corporation s

STATE
Michigan

ADOPTED
APPLICATION
1908 - c & L Art VII, Secs. 2 and 22
Cities, villages, counties

Minnesota

1896~

Mississippi

1900-L

Special charter cities

Missouri

1875-C & L

Art VI, Secs. 18 & 19
Any city of 10;000, and any county of
85,000

Nebraska

1912-C

Art. XI, Secs. 2-5
Any city of 5,000

New Hampshire

1963-L

Charter amending proce ss for c ities

Nevada

1924-C & L

Art. VIII Sec. 8
Cities and towns

New Jersey

1947-C

Art. IV, Sec VII(lO)
All municipalities

New Mexico

1949-C & L

Art x, Sec 4
Combined city and county municipal
corporations, municipalities

New York

1923-C & L

Art. IX
Every local government

No. Carolina

1917 - L

Municipalities

Ohio

1912 - C

Art X., Secs. 1-4 Counties
Art. XVIII. Secs. 3, 7-9. Municipalitia s

Oklattoma _

1907-C

Art • . XVIII, Sec. 3
Any city of 2,000

Oregon

1906 - C

Art. IV, Sec. la; Art. XI, Sec. 2 Cities
Art VI, Sec. 10 Counties

Pennsylvania

1922-C & L

Art. XV Sec. 1.
Cities of. 10,000

Rhode Island

1951-C

Art. XXVI"II
Cities and towns

Art. XI, Secs 3 & 4
Any city, village or county

C

&

L

(b)

STATE

ADOPTED

APPLICATION

So. Carolina

1899-L

Cities and towns may amend charters

So. Dakota

1962-C

Art. X, Sec. 4
Any municipal corporation

Tennessee

1953-C

Art XI, Sec. 9
Municipalities

Texas

1912-C & L

Art XI, Sec 5
Cities of 5,000

Utah

1932-C

Art. XI, Sec. 5
Any incorporated city or town

Virginia

1902-C & L

Sec. 117 (c)
Cities and towns

Washington

1889-C

Art XI, Sec. 4. Counties
Art. XI, Sec. 10 City of 10,000

West Virginia

1937-C

Art. VI, Sec. 39 (a)
Municipalities of 2,000

Wisconsin

1924-C & L

Art. XI, Sec. 3
Cities and villages

(c)

Home rule is an inherently relative concept. But other factors also have complicated the defining of the term. First, state
constitutions define hdme rule in vag~e and differing terms; to
determine local affairs and government (Wisconsin); to exercise
the powers and authority of local self~goverrunent (Pennsylvania):
to frame a charter for its own government (Oklahoma). Second,
home rule, usual.ly applied to municipalities alone, has never been
extended to all of a state's local units. In Missouri home rule
is extended to cities with population over 10,000: in Arizona, to
cities over 3,500: and in Colorado, to cities or towns of 2,000.
Third, not all constit~Tional home rule provisions are self-executing or fully utilized. Here the attitude of the legislature is
critical for should !:. "the legislature ••• (be] determined to retain
control of municipal affairs, it can find ways to evade more ~~)
less completely the home-rule section of the constitution ••• "
Fourth, home rule power is given to local governments only over
'local affairs'# But how and to what extent can 'local affairs'
be differentiated from state affairs? Courts have been called upon to make such determinations ·. Fixing any precise and definitive
line of demarcation between state and local affairs has been impossible because "[there] is no clear delineation between state
and local powers( interpretation varies from state to state, from
time to time ... (31
Another difficulty in defining home rule stems from the fact
that the concept is generally thought of in its historic sense
rather than its practical sense of today. Historically home rule
was an answer to domination of municipal affairs by state legislatures. Its purpose was to "prevent legislative involvement in
such politically pregnant processes as the control of local police
forces, construction of local public works, grant of utility franchises and use of the city payroll as an outlet for party patron"'"·age. (4)
Emphasis was put therefore on curbing excessive powers ·
of state legislatures, but little thought was given to an expansion of the powers of local governments in general. In certain
large cities like st. Louis and New York, attempts were made to
broaden local control over local affairs. But at that early date,
little consideration was given to the idea of giving all or most
local governments any significant power over their own affairs.
Today the real objective of home rule is not necessarily to curb
state legislative power but to give local governments the power
necessary for them to meet their growing local problems. Although
the concept of home rule has thus shifted from negative to positive, the thinking of home rule is still based on its negative emphasis. This conflict of negative and positive necessarily adds
to the difficulty of defining home rule.
11
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Before home rule, cities operated under legislative charters
which were of two types. One was the special charter for a particular city: the other was a general charter for a group of cities
or all cities. But government by legislative charters led ~ to extensive legislative interference in city affairs, a "rigidity in
municipal governmental systems," and the inability of rural legislatures to understand city problems.(5) In 1858 Iowa adopted home
rule by statute.(6) This innefective attempt to inaugurate home
rule was repealed shortly thereafter. Missouri gave home rule its
real start in an 1875 constitutional amendment providing home rule
for cities with 100,000 population or over, with particular provisions for st. Louis.(7) Constitutional home rule was adopted by
three states, California, Washington and Minnesota, before the
turn of the century. By 1915, nine other states had joined them.< 8 >
Today, thirty-one states have some kind of constitutional provision for home rule. Ten of these thirty-one have either adopted
or revised existing constitutional home rule provisions since 1950.
This would tend to refute the idea that the home rule "movement,
once so promising, has not spread because of the growing com)lexity of state-local relations in fields of mutual interest. <9
Indeed it would seem that the growing problems of urban areas have
created a need for some kind of local control of government - a
need so great as to overshadow the problems of state-local control.
11

Two elements of the early period of home rule are worth not~ · ·
ing, mainly because of their continued use today. In 1897 an
amendment to the· Ohio constitution required the state legislature
to group cities by population into seven classes. The number of
classes was so large that the legislature could manipulate the
population requirements of the classes so that the five largest
cities were in classes by themselves and the other cities were in
the remaining two classes. Thus the legislature was able to continue to dominate and control municipal affairs, the very thing
the classification plan was designed to prevent. Today the classification plan is used by many states with and without constitutional home rule. Most states have reduced the number of classes
and have avoided much of the difficulty presented by the early
Ohio plan. (10)
New York added a new dimension to home rule with the optional
charter plan. The state legislature was to provide model charters
for the different forms of municipal government. Communities
could then vote on charter revision. They also chose a board of
freeholders to study the problem, choose the best optional charter
for the community and offer it to the electorate for their approval.
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This gave communities at least some participation in the selection
of the form and structure of their local government. . In some areas
the legislatures designated on the basis of population which charter a community was to have.(11)
Home rule traditionally has been granted in three ways, constitutional provision, legislative act, and constitutional provision requiring legislative implementation.
Although constitutional provisions for home rule vary from
state to state, most have some points in common. They are (1) authority delegated to municipality to frame, adopt and amend a charter for local government: (2) general or specific exp~ession of
powers of municipaliti~s: (3) supremacy of state constitution and
laws over charter powers: and (4) a prohibition on the state le~i. ~
lature to incorporate municipalities by either special or local
acts. (12)
Self-executing constitutional home rule is the most recommended of the three methods for granting local self-governmental powers. This method allows municipalities to frame and adopt charters,
without enabling state legislation, according to procedures set in
the constitution. States with self-executing home rule provisions
are Arizona, California, Colorado, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah and Washington.< 13 )
The purposes of constitutional home rule are perhaps the best explanation for its high reconunendation in general and that of selfexecuting constitutional home rule in particular. They are "to
give a broad measure of self-government to cities in matters of
local concern ••• to make it less necessary for cities to make repeated requests of the state legislature for additional powers •••
[and) to make it more difficult to retract what has been given.(14)
While consitutional home rule is recommendable, it does have
serious limitations. One is the predication of the source of power not as constitutional but as legislative. In such cases little
distinction exists between a municipality's legal status in a constitutional home rule state and in u nonhome rule state. In neither case is the concept of state supremacy substantially impaired.
(lS) Another limitation is the requirement that local charters or
. amendments thereto must obtain legislative or executive approval
before they can be put into effect. Six states recently have had
such requirements. Arizona, Louisiana, Michigan and Oklahoma required approval of the governor. In California legislative consent was necessary and in West Virginia the attorney general's approval was required.(16) There are other limitations which, like
-3-

the two previcusly mentioned, apply to both constitutional and
legislative home rule. They are a "reservation of the legislative
power, by general laws, to legislate in areas of municipal concern
••• requirement that local laws or ordinances shali not be in conflict with general laws ••• [and] constitutionally imposed or authorized limits on municipal powers of taxation and incurrence of
indebtedness ..... (17)
Legislative or statutory home rule is provided for exclusively by the legislature. It is generally considered to be the least
desired type of home rule, especially because of the ease with ·
which it could be taken away by the legislature by either repeal
of the grant or by subsequent overriding state legislation. Seven
states have legislative home rule, (Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Miesis sippi, New Hampshire, North Carolina, South Carolina.)
Constitutional home rule provisions requiring some type of
enabling legislation, the third method of granting home rule, are
designated as either mandatory or permissive. Under mandatory
home rule legislative action implementing the constitutional principle of home rule is required. (Michigan, Minnesota, Louisiana,
West Virginia, Wisconsin.) Permissive home rule leaves the enactment of enabling legislation strictly to the discretion of the
state legislature. (New York, Washington, Pennsylvania are examples.) This method allows legislatures to ignore constitutional
home rule provisions. A good example of this is Pennsylvania.
Enabling legislation for a 1922 constitutional home rule provision
was not enacted until 1949, and then it was made applicable only
to the city of Philadelphia.(18)
Throughout its use home rule has been hamstrung by the problem of defining separate areas of state and local concern. The
need for such an allocation was created by the idea or dream that
there are substantial areas of complete autonomy for each level of
government -- national, state and local. The increasing complexity of life today and the resulting growing interdependence of governments should have dispelled this dream, but it has not. This
desire for complete local autonomy has resulted in a false and
necessarily insecure basis or reason for home rule. Instead of
looking forward and preparing for the inter-workings of interdependent governments, proponents of home rule looked inward and
sought to obtain, at the local leve1,complete power for power's
sake. Such an attitude truely "represents the wrong emphasis at
the wrong timeJ"(l9) and is more detrimental to home rule and its
future today than it was in 1875. It has brought forth such evaluations of home rule as the following:
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There was, and still is, that strange perversion of
the principle of home rule which makes of every incorporated ciby, village or borough, no matter how
young or insignificant, an impregnable fortress within which opposition to integrated metropolitan government can entrench itself.(20)
In the past the problem of defining powers simply overwhelmed
both proponents and opponents of home rule. Lists of separate powers were compiled in the hope of reaching some kind of consensus as
to which powers belonged to which government. The following should
provide evidence of the extent to which scholars were concerned
over division of powers and of their inability to reach any meaningful conclusion. Eugene McQuillen, ··· in his book ThE!_ Law of Muniq_ipal Corporations, cites as matters of local concern: "street construction, liens for sidewalk construction, special assessments
for improvements, maintenance of sewers and drains, parks and playgrounds, eminent domain, providing water, light and other utilities,
municipal officers, municipal taxes, forms of local government,
salaries of employees." Matters for the state are: "administration of justice, the maintenance of a police force, fire protection, public health, sanitary regulations, conservation of resources, education, neglected or delinquent children, elections, public
records, control of streets and traffic, public utility rates, conditions of work for municipal employees, boundaries, indebtedness
and taxation."(21) In his Law and Practice of Municipal Home Rule,
1916-1930, Joseph D. McGoldrick gives his lists more succinctly.
Public utilities, courts, annexation, and education are state matters to him, while forms of government, police, local officials,
zoning, general police power and local health, safety and welfare
are matters of local concern. He goes one step more in saying that
no concensus existed for such things as eminent domain, taxation,
cla~s, special assessments and indebtedness.(22)
There are two principal ways in which states have sought to
cope with the problem of division of powers. One way is to define
and list the powers delegated to local governments by home rule
provisions. Colorado and Utah are states that use this method.
(Colorado Constit~tion, Article XX, Section 6 and Utah Constitution, Article XI, Section 5.) The other way is to state in broad
and general terms the home rule powers given to local governments
to provide ordinances for #: local affairs and government" or municipal affairs." Both methods present serious and limiting problems.
Criticism of the first method is that any such definition or listing is neither definitive nor exhaustive. Furthermore the problems
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of our expanding and changing society tend to outdate any such
listing, making it increasingly useless. The second method is no
more successful than the first, for it leaves "the division of powers in so much doubt that extensive litigation is required to interpret what is a local and what is a state power. 11 (23) In the
final analysis the courts are called upon to render an interpretation of state and local powers regardless of which method of def ining power a state chooses.
Leaving the matter in the hands of the courts has several disadvantages. First of all is the permanency of these court decisions. Today's court decisions are constantly reversed by the
changing concepts of state and local concerns. Second, such a move
places too much power in the hands of judges. A "determination of
the actual extent of power to be exercised is wholly a question of
policy and not at all a question of law" and we do no~ choose our
judges to make "public policy on the local leve1. <24 > The third
point is that courts in the past have tended to rule against local
governments. They adhere to the strict interpretation of local
powers that is stated in the "Dillon Rule", a principle of municipal corporation law first stated by John F .. Dillon, a 19th century
Iowa judge. lt "holds that a municipality can exercise only those
powers that: 1) are expressly granted or that 2) are implied in or
incidental to those expressly granted, or that 3) are essential
for the purposes of the municipal government. (25) If there is
any "reasonable" doubt, the decision is for the state. The resulting roi.1triction o~ 'lu:thority of local governments is evident in
several st~tes, among them Ohio, Michigan, Rhode Island and Wisconsin. <26 J
11

11

There are some court decisions that have tended to strengthen
municipal home ·rule. In one such case in 1948 (City of El Paso v.
State, ex. rel. _Town _of Ascarte), the Texas Supreme Court "interpreted a home rule provision as conferring residual powers upon
cities. A home rule city ••• acts by authority of its constitutional powers and not through powers assigned to it by the legislature ... (27) In another case (La Fleur etal vs. City of Baton
Rouge, Nov. 15, 1960) the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Louisiana ruled that Baton Rouge, with its constitutional home rule provision, neet not comply with pay for city firemen set by state
legislation. Part of the decision is worth noting:
It is difficult to conceive how the structure and
organization of the fire department could be ef.
fectuated by the City of Baton Rouge without giving t
particular cons.i:.d~r.r1_t:i 0n to the salaries to be paid
-6-

to the firemen. Since the aforesaid constitutional
provision reserves all matters of structure and organization exclusively to the defendant, City of
Baton Rouge, it follows that the question of pay of
a fireman, being a matter of structure and organization as distinguished from a power or function,
is reserved exclusively to defendant herein.(28)
But perhaps the most significant of recent pro-home rule court
decisions was that handed down in 1962 by the Oregon Supreme Court.
The case (State ex~ rej._!__!.l_~i~~ng v_~~_l_ty___ 9f_M_!lw~_ajtie) involved a
1959 statute that required civil service systems for firemen employed by any political subdivision with four or more full time
firemen. In denying the statutes application to cities, the cou~L
said:
We now expressly hold that the legislative assembly
does not have the authority to enact a law relating
to city government even though it is of general appli"' ·_.
cability to all cities in the state unless the subject matter of the enactment is of general concern
to the state as a whole, that is to say ••• is a matter of more than local concern to each of the municipalities purported to be regarded by the enactment.(29)
Unfortunately such positive decisions are the exception instead of the rule. And until such decisions are more consistent
and extensive, the courts must be regarded as an enemy by home rule
proponents.
Thus the emphasis on the problem of diversion of powers between state and local governments has and will continue to lead to
increasingly difficult tangles to be worked out by home rule advocates. This misdirection must be corrected by removing the wrong
emphasis, the demand to do the impossible. Instead of being concerned with any kind of absolute separation of powers, home rule
proponents should turn to strengthening local governments so that
they may be more effective partners with state and national governments in matters of concurrent concern.
In order to strengthen local governments, steps soon must be
taken to increase local control over local taxation. Although
home rule provisions relating to the form and structure of local
governments have been generally the most accepted and recognized
of home rule powers, provisions relating to revenue have been the
ones most consistently blocked by both the legislatures and the
courts. Such opposition has prevented home rule from helping local
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governments become effective, responsible units for the handling
of at least. some local problems. Thus while local governments have
been called upon increasingly to provide more and more local services, the sources of revenue which could enable local government
to act have been pre~empted by national and state governments.
Complete freedom with respect to taxation is neither desirable nor feasible since local governments are political subdivisions of the state. But some kind of revision is necessary in order that local governments may meet the needs of those they serve.
This is true for all local governments, not just those with home
rule, for while s.t ates give local governments the right to tax
property, "this right is hedged about with many restrictions that
determine the basis . of property valuation, the rates of tax that
must be levied, and the methods of collection and enforcement. <30 >
11

Revenue and taxation for bane ru1e governments, illogically,
almost always are even more restricted. Constitutional limitations
on tax rates ·and municipal indebtedness are areas which illustrate
this point most clearly. Some states specify legislative power to
set such limitations directly in their constitutional home rule
provisions (Ohio, Article XVIII, Sec 13; Nebraska, Article XI,
Sec. 4; West Virginia, Article VI, Sec 39a). Other states fix such
limitations in the constitution itself (Texas, Article XI, Sec. 5;
Wisconsin, Article XI, Sec. 3). These limitations are directed
mainly at ad valorem property taxes and generally are not factors
in setting municipal powers in the nonproperty tax field. "However, to the extent that the tax and debt powers are either constitutionally proscribed or legislatively imposed through constitutional directive, municipal autonomy in the revenue field is
severely circumscribed. (31) And while the limitations themselves
present a problem, the fact that these often rigid tax and debt
limitations "bear little relation to present-day conditions ..... (32)
compounds the revenue problems of local governments. Finally,
court decisions have been an important factor in restricting home
rule power in the revenue field. "In states where ••• [constitutional home rule] provisions have been effective in increasing municipal revenue powers, particularly in California ••• this has been
achieved by judicial construction rather than by express constitutional language. (33)
11

11

California can perhaps be pointed to as the best example of
effective constitutional home rule in the revenue field. Local
autonomy in ·revenue matters is considered to be almost complete.
Unlike other states, California lacks constitutional provisions
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for the legislature to enact by general laws provi~ions for municipal affairs or for any "specific reservations of legislative control in the area of revenue."(34) California's success can be attributed, at least in part, to such omissions and to a rather liberal judicial interpretation of the revenue problem.
Of particular interest is California•s substantial municipal
autonomy in the nonproperty tax field. Judicial decisions have
interpreted taxation as a "municipal affair" whose power comes
specifically from the constitution. Furthermore, a municipal
charter is not considered a grant of powers, but a limitation on
powers.
The legal effect of these principles is that (1)
statutory authorization for the imposition of nonproperty taxes is unnecessary, and (2) absence of
charter authorization does not preclude the exercise
of the taxing power unless the charter itself contains
a limitation. Under this liberal approach, California
cities have successfully levied numerous types of business, privilege, occupationa, and excise taxes.{35)
Today thirty-eight states have some form either of constitutional or legislative home rule. Of these, seven have only legislative home rule, ctyenty have only constitutional home rule,
while the remaining . eleven ' have both. Further classification
reveals that of the thirty-eight states, fourteen have both city
and county home rule. The other twenty-four states have only
municipal home rule. In the past municipal home rule was more
popular, as seen by the fact that by 1954, two-thirds of United
States cities with 200,000 or more population had home rule. By
contrast, it is only recently that county home rule has come into
prominence. Of the fourteen states having county home rule, ten
have adopted it since World War II. County home rule's rather recent popularity and acceptance questions the viability of municipal home rule and in so doing requires a comparison of the two to
determine which it should be -- municipal or county home rule?
But there is a third alternative, no home rule. Because of this,
an examination of county home rule necessarily must be part of a
critical look at home rule itself.
The major criticism of home rule is that it has . not produced
the results its advocates promised. But just what was expected
from home rule? The American Municipal Association states the
major objectives of home rule as follows: "To prevent legislative
interference with local government, to enable local governments to
-9-
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to adopt the ·k ind of government they desire and to provide local
goverrunents with sufficient powers to meet the increasing needs
for local services" (37) The resuits.·of home rule have fallen far
short of these stated objectives. But these results are not the
product of home rule but of forces in almost complete power working against home rule. Therefore the results should be seen not
as proof positive against the principle of home rule but as indications of areas in which home rule must be re-evaluated and eith~
er supported or abandoned.
The strongest point in favor of home rule "is tha~ political
power should be divided in our society. 11 (38) This is ·so despite
the impossibility of specifically designating certain governme u·t al functions to each level of government alone. Self~dotermina
tion is still a vital and important part in the expanding role of
government today. Instead of negating, the tremendous size and
scope o~ gov·e rnment today emphasizes the point "that the closer
those who make and execute the laws are to the citizens they represent the better are those citizens represented and governed in
accordance with democratic ideals."(39) It is at the local level
of government that this self-determination is and can be expressed most completely. Home rule is one method for providing for
such expression.
There are other more specific arguments for home rule. One
is that while there are problems conunon to urban areas, problems
common to·· rural areas, and some common to both, there are no solutions. .common to all. For "each county, city and town there is a
unique solution for its apparently conmon problem. Other levels
of government are simply too large and too removed to be able to
adequate~y comprehend the particular circumstances surrounding a
particular community's ills. Only through the freedom and responsibility of home rule can a community use the resources offered
to solve its problems.
Another advantage of home rule is that it has provided for
experimentation and variations in the structure of local government. This is. .- of singular importance today when increasing urbanization has posed new problems and required changes in municipal government to meet these problems. Home rule is of value here
because it permits charters to be made specifically to meet a community's ' ;needs.· and adds the element of felxibility, missing from
legislative charters, to enable the community to cope with its
changing needs. This individuality and flexibility is needed particu.l ariy in large cities and urban counties where
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special difficulties encountered ••• have increased
the desirablility of the city's [or county's] · right
to experiment in the matter of structure and organization and thus enable ••• [the city or county] to
take advantage of new techniques and developemnts.
'Any system of legislative control which substantially
withholds this power of experimentation from the
hands of citizens most concerned diminished the
efficiency of local government and represents a
'dG;nial o.f democratic theory.(40)
It may not be a denial of democratic theory, but the"investing of powers of local goverrunent in a central state legislathre
body, far removed in interest, knowledge and experience from the
needs of municipal government •• .• is ••• arbitrary ••• unrealistic •••
[and] destructive of the aims of good government.,; (41) Home rule
would not only put the power of local goverrunent in .hands of more
experienced and interested people, but it would also bring the
power to the problems quicker. Without home rule, local governments must wait until the legislature is in session to have their
problems considered, much less solved. This is of critical importance in most states for only 19 states have annual legislative
sessions. Furthermore home rule would help relieve legislatures
of much of the burden imposed by numerous and time consuming local bills. In many states the adoption of home rule has resulted
in a significant decrease in the number of local bills passed.
In Kansas 52 'city bills' were enacted in 1957 and · 48 in 1959.
With home rule the figure dropped to 17.(42) In Connecticut the
number of local bills dropped from 234 in 1957 to 76 in 1961.(43}
As mentioned before, these results are but indications of
areas where the home rule principle must be re-evaluated and either supported or abandoned. Such an examination was made in 1953
by Jefferson B. Fordham for the American Municipal Association.
The result was a set of model constitutional home rule provisions
which set forth a 111 local federalism' formula, whereby home-rule
cities would exercise all powers which are not denied them by
charter, or denied them by statute, and which are within such limitations as may be established by statute. <4 5) In the words of
the provisions "the power is there unless al.early denied by positive enactment (46) The provisions recognize the impossibility
of distinguishing between state and local powers by simply putting
aside the necessity for making such a distinction. Furthermore
the provisions are designed to meet a problem basic to home rule,
i.e., the making "of every incorporated city, village or borough,
no matter how young or insignificant, an impregnable fortress
11

11
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within which opposition to integrated metropolitan government can
entrench itself~< 47 > The introduction to the provisions states
this most clearly:
It is designed to give practical expression to
genuine home rune policy without exalting local
independence in fixed geographical areas to the
.: .extent of materially hampering the making of
provision for effective organization and authority
to perform needed governmental functions i~ the state.(48)
While the American Municipal Association's provisions are
·realistic and forward looking, they take no notice· of the problems
and the possibilities of county home rule. Although county home
rule was constitutionally adopted as early as 1911 (Calif.) it
gained little acceptance until fairly recently. one reason for
·its lack of early approval was its marked difference from cities.
·C ities were economic, social and cultural units created by economic forces and they functioned to meet the local needs of ·their
people. On the other hand, counties were created by states to
serve as ·1ocal administrative units for state responsibilities.
·1t was, and still is, argued that since counties' "purely local
functions have been assigned largely as a matter of convenience
••• the home rule argument loses a great deal of its force when
cpplied to counties·. (49) But such a statement fails to take into
account the true character of urban counties today. Urban growth
and problems have not been confined by city limits but have spread
to adjacent areas. The result is that these areas are now metro.P olitan or urban counties, not cities, yet they are called upon
more and more to provide its people with municipal type services.
It is like trying to feed a giant with a baby's spoon. Most counties are ill-equipped to meet such demands. And if it is that the
counties 'in the future must provide such services, some change
will have to be made so that county government will be able to so
function.
11

The growing urban areas and their problems have increased
the desirability of county home rull in another way. Just as this
growth has resulted in more responsibility for counties, so has it
increased t~e responsibility of the state and the nation. The
very size of the problem means that one single level of government
cannot handle the problem--all must work together for a successful
solution. Here the fact that c·o unties were created by and for the
state 1s ·an advantage, for it means that counties and the state,
with already existing channels' of corcununication and interaction,
will be ;mo"re prepared ·and, hopefully, willing to work together on
-12-

conunon problems. County home rule would strengthen counties and
help them be a more effective part of the continuing relation$hip
of the state and its counties.
Arguments Against County Home Rule
1. Both urban and rural counties need to be controlled by the
state legislature so that state-wide aolutions may be applied to
problems common to all urban counties. In the past states have
not met "the problems of their urban areas, but if they cede power
to do this by permitting home rule they will never be motivated to
come to grips with state responsibility for helping effectuate
orderly urban and industrial development" .since they will no lon<1-:
er have the "power to legislate over metropolitan area matters. lSO)
11

2. Municipal home rule has caused many of today's problems.
Why expand these problems in the future with grants of county
home rule? (51) Over one-third of the standard metropolitan
areas in the United States are composed of more than one county
and indications are that the number of such areas will increase
in the future.(52) In these situations any solution on a countywide basis would be far too limited. Here county home rule would
tend to impede rather than facilitate solutions for local problems
by creating several units of power in one metropolitan area, any
one of which could thwart a~ea wide actions •
... .... ·

3. County home rule may be obsolete or outdated, even at this
relatively early stage, as a solution to many problems of local
government. More research and study of metropolitan area problems
and their possible solutions is needed before advocating one as the
solution, especially before declaring county home rule to "be a yanacea for the solution of all ills of urban area government •• ( 53
Arguments for County Home Rule
1. There have been increased demands on county governments
for local services. Unfortuantely counties are ill-equipped to
provide such services. County governments need to be reorganized
and strengthened to meet these demands and to "obviate the necessity of establishing a third level of goverrunent or a super government to administer county-wide functions. 11 (54) Other methods
have tried to solve the problems of county goverrunents without
any real success. One such method is the independent special service district. In spite of isolated achievements, "the single
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purpose district is still a single purpose district and is, by
its nature, forever doomed to failure in solving general metropolitan problems." (55) Cooperation is another ' .m ethod which has
had limited success. While such a method "can help to make life
in a metropolitan area somewhat more tolerable - as where a core
city sells water at double the regular city rate to its suberbs"
it does not tend to lead "to the establislunent of a strong areawide government ••• [and] may delay indefinitely the attainment of
that goal by diminishing th.e popµlar demand for it." (56) .It is
obvious that some kind of solution is needed that is area-wide in
scope. County home rule is one method which could deal with area
wide problems.
2. Another agrurnent for county home rule is stated best in
the words of Gladys Kammerer:
Democratic theory decrees that power should rest in
the local electorate to frame a charter of government
best suited to its own needs for management ••• Power
should be commensurate with responsibility and if
responsibility has become county-wide in scope as to
many services, sufficient authority must be given to
the county electorate to provide adequate governmental . machinery to solve its problems.(57)
3. Many problems confronting urban counties demand a countywide solution. Anything less would result in pn uneconomical and
inefficient provision of uncoordinated services.(58) This is of
particular significance with reference to small municipalities and
unincorporated areas that lack the finances to provide the needed
urban-type services. The county's more extensive tax base brings
demands for such services to the county. It is only "on a countywide basis under unified management 11 (59) that such demands can be
met economically.
4. Urban problems are and will be dealt with through the combined actions of national, state and local governments. "Home
rule principles offer the only possibility of retaining a local
voice i~ tbe affairs of these huge and permanent national programs. 11 l60J.. county home rule is better equipped to do the job
than municipal home rule because it is larger in scope and can
speak for the whole ·area affected instead of a fragment of it.
Both municipal and county home rule have their strengths and
weaknesses. Their most obvious strength is a fact basic to the
whole concept of home rule, i.e., that areas and communities each
-14-'

have problems and solutions unique to themselves. Moreover these
problems are never stable but are in a constant state of change.
No one solution or form of goverrunent is completely suited for all
communities or even for a single classification of communities.
Local governements must be flexible enough to adapt their government to fill their needs and meet their problems. Often state or
national goverrunent :aid will be necessary but the local implementations of such aid must be adapted to the particular situations
of each community: otherwise the aid will be wasted. And this is
the strength of home· rale - that there are as many faces and express ions of home rule as there are camnunities to use it.
Thus the answers to the questions of home rule or no home
rule, or county or municipal home rule cannot be given solely on
the basis of an evaluation of home rule itself. The decision must
first of all be based on the singular needs and circumstances of
the commilnity involved.
Florida
Technically Florida has had legislative home rule since 1915.
According to Sec. 166.01-166.15 Florida Statutes, every city or ·
town may alter or amend their charter. - Realistically this provision for municipal home rule is and has been meaningless, for . it
means that cities and towns are permitted only to reshuffle and
reorganize what they already have. If the power to perform certain functions was not given to a city or town in its original
charter, then the city or town may not perform such functions.
Furthermore, cities and towns have been reluctant to make use of
the powers delegated in Sec 166.01-166.15 because it would take
only a special act of the legislature to overrule it.
Home rule really came to Florida in 1956 with the adoption of
a home rule charter for Dade county. (Florida Constitution Article VIII Sec. 11). Municipal as well as county home rule was provided for in Sec 11 (l)(g) which states that the county home rule
charter would "provide a method by which each municipal corporation in Dade County shall have the power to make, amend or repeal
its own charter." Of particular importance is the way Dade County's
charter seeks to handle the problem of overlapping home rule jurisdictions.
Although the charter "reserves to ·the voters of the municipalities the sole right to abolish the municipality, it permits the
county to set minimum standards for the performance of any service
or function and to ••• [assume the performance of] a service within
-15-

any municipality which fails to meet the standards.*' Thus the
charter would seem to reduce "drastically the amount of legal municipal home rule authority in the area of substantive powers."(61)
Dade County's solution of subordinating home rule powers of municipalities to the home rule powers of the county, if effective,
would tend to minimize the danger of municipal home rule's creating islands of power which could continually thwart any county-wide
attempts to handle local problems.
~?Ji)
~lluJl.-

Un fort u ante l y Dade County's home rule Qhartr£r has provisions
which tend to minimize effective home rule. At least similar provisions in the past have had the result of weakening home rule.
One such provision gives the county governing body (the Board of
County Commissioners) "full power and authority ••• to levy and collect such taxes as may be authorized by general law and no other
taxes ••• " [Sec. ll(l)(b)). Lack of sufficient home rule power in
the taxing field has already been pointed out as a severe handicap, an almost prohibitive factor, in obtaining meaningful home
rule. Another limiting provision is Sec. 11 (6):
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit
or restrict the power of the Legislature to enact
general laws which shall relate to Dade County and
any other one or more counties of the state of Florida
or to any municipality in Dade County and any other
one or more municipalities of the State of Florida
relating to county or municipal affairs and all such
general laws shall apply to Dade County and to all
municipalities therein to the same extent as if this
section had not been adopted and such general laws
shall supersede any part or portion of the home rule
charter provided for herein in conflict therewith
and shall supersede any provision of any ordinance
enacted pur.s uant to said charter and in conflict
therewith and shall supersede any provision of
any charter of any municipality in Dade County in
conflict therewith.
Many of Florida's 67 counties have ceased being just an administrative district for the State and now function more as a
service unit to provide for local needs. But the counties generally are not equipped to serve in this modern capacity. County
officers are prescribed in sections S(adopted 1900, amended 1944)
and 6 (adopted 1914) of Article VIII of the State constitution.
~he power. to determine and change powers and ·duties of county
government mainly rests with the state legislature. And where
-16-

additional powers have been given piecemeal to counties, they have
been unable to use them efficiently. The resulting confusion has
brought forth this critique:
The constitutionally created elective county officers
need not cooperate with each other and, indeed,. lack
any instrumentality over them for coordination of
their work. The usual fragmentation of service functions ••• among commission members insures . a lack of
coordination similar to that prevailing among the
elective officers. Each commissioner, in effect, may
and of ten does go his own way in running his own set
of services according to his own individual set of
standards with little, if any, reference to the
policies and actions of his fellow commissioners
directing other services.(62)
Such a situation seems hardly capable of achieving the "univied coherent direction and management" especially needed by
urban counties todayo(63)
In addition to 67 counties, local governments in Florida include 366 municipalities and 264 special districts for a total of
697. There were in addition 67 school districts which would increase the total to 764.(64) The number of local government units
in the state has grown continually in the last twenty years. There
were 503 units in 1942, 616 in 1952 and 671 in 1957
The 1962
total broken down shows 67 counties, 310 municipalities, 227 special districts and 67 school districts. Not counted in the totals
are 30 unincorporated areas having 1,000 or more population and
more than 76 bodies, such as Jacksonville Expressway Authority,
Fort Pierce Port Authority, considered to be subordinate of state
or local govermnents.(65) The increase in the number of special
districts is of particular importance in the solution of urban
area-wide problems. At best special districts represent a piece
by piece, fragment by fragment approach to such problems, the antithesis of the closely coordinated actions required for solutions
to such area wide problems as highways, housing and schools.(66)
Incorporation of cities in the state is through charters ·
granted by special acts of the legislature. This means that numerous 'local bills' concerning a change in a charter or a iocal
matter must be acted on at each session of the legislature.. Despite the practice of summarily passing all such 'local bills'
that have the approval of the legislative delegation concerned,
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these bills do take up valuable legislative time in the limited
~iennial · sessions. The sheer number of such bills should be indicative of that. The following is a list of the number of General and Local and Special laws passed during the last regular sessions of the state legislature:
~

General

1965
1963
1961
1959
1957

586
574
539
523
523
2745

Total

Special and Local
1832
1473
2476,
1472
1444
8697

The overwhelming predominance of Special and Local laws is evidence that some solution such as home rule is not only advisable·,
but necessary. Furthermore, the five counties of Brevard, Hillsborough, Duval, Orange and Pinellas account for 1295 of the 8697
Special and Local laws. And the number of such laws .for these
counties is increasing. Duval and Hillsborough couni i are proof
of this:
Hillsborough

Duval
1965
86
1963 - 53
1961 - 56

1959 - 62
1957 - 45
Total 302

1965 - 86
1963 - 26
1961 -129·

1959 - 42
1957 - 42
Total 325

This would be advantageous not just to local governments, but to
the state as well, for it would mean that the legislature would
have more adequate time to deal with major state problems.
Another problem in Florida, which almost begs for a solution,
is the fact that state legislators, elected to deal with statewide problems, in fact control the local · ~ills in the legislature
and thus are the main determinant in
strictly local matters.
Gladys Kammerer considers this a violation of democratic theory.
Essentially, through their control over local legislation and the mutual courtesy arrangements to pass
all local bills, they are given power without responsibility. The electorate is usually too confused by a multiplicity of issues in .a campaign and
they need to we~gh legislative records on a great
variety of st~te 'issues to hold their legislators
to account for sins of omission or commission on
local government legislation. The voters are therefore
-18-

powerless to hold their state legislators accountable
for failures by county officers to solve local problems aggravated by a refusal of the legislators to
cooperate with the county officials.(67)
Home tlule could curb such excessive control by returning significant power to local goverrunents.
The situation and problems of local govermnents in Florida
indicate a need for home rule. Examination of home rule in other
states has led to these conclusions as to what Florida's home rul~
should include:
1) Home rule should be constitutional and self-executing.
2)- Revenue and taxation provisions should be broad and
realistic.
3) The legislature should classify municipalities into
not more than four classes based strictly upon
population
4) The legislature should pass only general laws relating
to municipal cprporations.
5) The qualified voters of a conununity should be given the
power to adopt, amend and repeal a home rule
charter proposed by a local charter conunission.
6) Home rule goverrunents should be given power to exercise any function or power which the legislature
has power to devolve on a non-home rule government, or which is not statutorily denied them.
Home rule for Duval County, or municipal home rule for its
cities, is a complex question. Other than Jacksonville the remaining four municipalities are so limited in size that the need
for home rule is not pressing. However, Jacksonville is continually hamstrung by lack of authority over purely local matters.
Perhaps even more pressing have been the problems of the urban unincorporated area. The urbanized area immediately outside the
Jacksonville city limits is now a bigger "city" than Jacksonville
itself. While the city contains some 200,000 people, the adjoining area has in excess of 250,000. Virtually all of our growth
is outside the city limits, (indeed the city declined in population fran 1950 to 1960 while the county as a whole increased some
49%.)

As pointed out previously, County government is ill-equipped
to perform urban services. This has been repeatedly self-evident
in Duval. The inability of .our population to provide solutions
__ , _9-

to our rapid growth has placed a peculiar burden on our legislative delegation. County residents in unincorporated areas have
grown·to rely on the legislative delegation to protect their obvious interests in the city of Jacksonville from which they as
citizens are disenfranchised from participating ih. This watch•
dog role has seemingly resulted in city resentment which has led
to the city refusing to take initiative in new areas of endeavor ·.
The, charge is often made that the city follows only the letter of
the law as written and does not on its own initiative strive for
a higher standard. This in turn has placed the legislative delegation in the role of a disciplinary conunittee over the city - a
role they are obviously ill-equipped to handle by the very natur·e
of their part-time appointments, lack of staff, etc. (Interestingly only
of our eight legislators lives within the Jacksonvi.l le city limits).

=

Home rule provisions are only ef fect.ive if the local government to which they apply is itself strong. The very essence of
home rule is self initiation. In this respect it is apparent that
in Duval County we have often failed .to meet our problems - our
unincorporated area is but one manifestation of this~ (Note that
home rule provisions sometimes include automatic annexation provisions.) Schools, pollution, crime, slum abatement, etc. add to
a long list of local problems we have not effectively coped with.
In most instances we can ·only point the finger of blame at ourselves. Thus, unless we can provide a system of gover~~nt which
will dissapate our internal jealousy _. and turn our goverrunent into
a viable progressive vehicle for action rather than a passive
space filler, home rule will be of limited value to us. Home rule
is a tool ~or exerting strong leadership and self determination
over local affairs. As a tool it is only as useful as the strength
of the craftsmen who utilize it.
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